Fabius Maximus

Summary:   With US military forces engaged around the world in the long war, with three conflicts burning at once (on very different scales), the doctrines we choose may have a large effect on American history.  This, the first of the Attritionist Letters, describes the issues and the stakes.  See the introduction to this series if you’re not familar with the subject; see the links at the end for more information.  Comments are open for this series.

“Attritionist Letter #1“, Marine Corps Gazette, May 2010 — Posted here with permission from the Marine Corps Association.  To protect the authors’ careers, the Gazette’s Editor published these anonymously (for more about this, see section 6a of this website’s authors page).  See the links at the end for more information about these issues.

Introduction

I have no intention of explaining how the correspondence, which I now offer to the public, fell into my hands. The general who authored them is almost certainly retired, for he writes with such careless disregard — and one might suggest some contempt — for our beloved Corps. The young captain to whom he writes is a more puzzling case; there are far too many Capt Wormwoods in the global access list to determine which is being addressed. Nevertheless, it is the essence of these papers that I find disconcerting— and thus the urgency with which I submit them to you,the reader.

Text

Captain Wormwood,

From your lessons at The Basic School (TBS), you no doubt recall the great 1989 victory won in Quantico by those who called themselves “maneuverists.” Then-Commandant, Gen Alfred M. Gray, arrayed his forces against us — we the noble “attritionists” — to do battle over the philosophy upon which the Marine Corps would operate. Gen Gray’s forces attempted to redefine the Marine Corps with a new interpretation of military theory, that of “maneuver warfare.”

For the past two decades, these maneuverists have touted their victory. But as you know, young Wormwood, we are far from dead. In fact, attritionist forces have long waged a surreptitious insurgency on all fronts of the Corps. Now, even as those maneuverists celebrate the 20th anniversary of their victory, it is increasingly evident that they have all but lost the war. As the Corps has quietly transitioned from a “maneuver-centric” philosophy back to a more attritionist one, you will note that Marine Corps Doctrinal Publication 1 (MCDP 1), Warfighting, has remained anchored in the past, dated and inadequate. It should be quite obvious that the Marine Corps in no way conducts itself in accordance with this document.

What is more, very few Marines realize this — and fewer still even care! It is now almost useless as a reference upon which to base action. As a young Marine officer, you can appreciate the importance of ensuring doctrine is kept current. This is the sign for which we have been waiting! In order to accurately reflect those attritionist methodologies we have striven so hard to implement and currently employ, MCDP 1, Warfighting, must be revised.

We must not strive for certainty before we act, for in so doing we will surrender the initiative and pass up opportunities.  The very nature of war makes certainty impossible; all actions in war will be based upon incomplete, inaccurate, or even contradictory information.

You will recognize the previous excerpts from the current version of MCDP 1, Warfighting. While they could have been uttered by Sun Tzu, Moltke (the elder, of course), Clausewitz, or even Patton, they represent the most dangerous line of thinking to our Corps. Military philosophers have long suggested that uncertainty and disorder are inherent attributes of war. Clausewitz said that:

“. . . the commander must work in a medium which his eyes cannot see; which his best deductive powers cannot always fathom; and with which, because of constant changes, he can rarely become familiar.”

You, my dear Wormwood, being at the dawn of your career, are perhaps most familiar with the traditional Marine Corps position on this line. Since 1989 Marine schoolhouses have attempted to familiarize the student with an environment of intentionally diminished situational awareness while simultaneously demanding decisive action. This was intended to create tolerance for uncertainty and simultaneously discourage the expenditure of energies in seemingly fruitless attempts to ascertain certainty. Surely you can recall that most horrific utterance from an overzealous TBS instructor, “What now, Lieutenant?”

“But to what end?” I have long asked. Wormwood, you will note with zeal that over the past several years, we have succeeded in finally convincing Marine commanders that they can no longer tolerate the uncertainty and disorder traditionally characteristic of battlefields from time immemorial. No longer must we attempt to appease our discomfort at an unruly battlefield in which we lack complete and clear situational awareness. Quite the opposite, we can no longer tolerate uncertainty. We must ensure that primacy of effort lies with pursuing certainty.

As a mere captain of Marines, there is no need for you to clutter your mind with military theory. However, if you feel so inclined, there is an author who claims:

“When confronted with a task, and having less information available than is needed to perform that task, an organization may react in either of two ways. One is to increase its information processing capacity, the other to design the organization, and indeed the task itself, in such a way as to enable it to operate on the basis of less information. It is obvious that maneuverists would rather accomplish the latter while we attritionists have long sought to pursue the former.”  {Martin van Creveld, Command in War, 1985}

You will note with pride that fellow attritionists have worked ever so diligently to ensure that billions of dollars are invested to procure the latest technologies with the primary objective being the elimination of disorder and uncertainty on the battlefield.

• C2PC (command and control personal computer),
• CPOF (command post of the future),
• AFATDS (advanced field artillery tactical data system),
• and other like systems (as well as their interface) promise an unparalleled clarity on the current battlefield.

Similarly, intelligence preparation of the battlespace is becoming extraordinarily focused on product development in order to provide the commander with the answers for any possible data requests. From your reading of Napoleon, you will recall that he would implore intelligence staffs to find “any information I might find of interest” and subsequently leave it to their initiative. How pathetic! Today’s commanders can — and therefore do — rightfully demand ever-increasing amounts of quantitative information with which to eliminate uncertainties and disorder on the battlefield. For only when the highest echelon commanders are provided all of the information can they determine the appropriate course of action and issue forth appropriate tasks for subordinates. You can see that current technology has eliminated Clausewitz’s “fog of war.”

I cannot recall when you last deployed to CentCom (U.S. Central Command). Was it earlier this year? Last year? Either way, you must have observed that our movement is gaining significant assistance from military contracting firms. Even in a recent issue of the Marine Corps Gazette — that forum for discourse among our Corps’ best — one firm actually published an advertisement clearly identifying “uncertainty” as the primary enemy and offering the military extensive command and control system capabilities in order to resolve the problem.

I have seen similar advertisements from other companies, both offering elaborate (although expensive) information and command and control systems that seek to “increase information-processing capability” rather than to pursue the useless objective of allowing the commander to become comfortable with uncertainty. These advertisements are, of course, not targeted at junior officers like you, Wormwood, but rather they are intended to connect with our Corps’ decisionmakers. I must admit that upon seeing the advertisements, I was flooded with an immense sense of relief — relief that our position, so long banned from respectable circles, is now firmly entrenched and even valued at the highest levels.

I have no doubt that we are achieving our objectives in Afghanistan and Iraq primarily through increased use of technologies that seek to eliminate uncertainty on the battlefield. Deluded maneuverists will argue that these new technologies can actually introduce more confusion into the operating environment. They will also try to argue that rather than attempt to banish uncertainty from the battlefield, Marines should train more extensively in such unpredictable environments in order to develop confidence in their abilities. By clinging to such dated ideas, the maneuverists are proving their ineptitude by their refusal to accept the obvious: technology has eliminated the need to be comfortable in chaos. After all, one of our most esteemed fellow attritionists, retired MG J.F.C. Fuller, wrote, “Weapons, if only the right ones can be found, form 99% of the victory.”

Capt Wormwood, I am cognizant of your contribution — albeit a small and almost meaningless one — to this cause. At times, however, you strike me as almost rambunctious and unpredictable. How many times must I tell you? Take no unnecessary risk! Make no unnecessary decision! You would do well to simply pay attention and emulate those seniors (such as myself) who are kind enough to have assumed the responsibility for your leadership development as we proceed in our most worthy cause. Stay vigilant, for just as victory is near, it can also be seized away at the last. Until then, I remain,

General Screwtape

For more information

(a)  Important background material:

• Text of The Screwtape Letters by C. S. Lewis.
• Links to all of The Attritionist Letters, posted at The Marine Corps Gazette
• Explanation of the attritionist and maneuverist doctrines:  ”The Changing Face of War: Into the Fourth Generation”, Marine Corps Gazette, October 1989 (image here, text here).

(b)  Other relevant articles:

1. “Culture Wars“, Donald E. Vandergriff (Major, US Army, retired), Originally published as a chapter in Digital War: A View from the Frontline (editor R. Bateman, 1999)
2. “The Next War? Four Generations of Future Warriors“, Eric M. Walters (Prof History at American Military University) — Powerpoint

(c)   See these FM Reference pages for archives of other posts on this topic:

• Military and strategic theory
• America’s national defense strategy and military

(d)  Some posts about the debate about military doctrine for the long war:

1. A solution to 4GW — the introduction, 12 March 2008
2. The US Army brings us back to the future, returning to WWI’s “cult of the offense”, 13 February 2009
3. Our tactics are an obstacle to victory in the Long War, as the Darwinian Ratchet works against us, 19 April 2011 – A serious side-effect of attritionist methods

(e)  Posts about our senior generals:

1. The Core Competence of America’s Military Leaders, 27 May 2008
2. The moral courage of our senior generals, or their lack of it, 3 July 2008
3. Generals read “Ender’s Game” and see their vision of the future Marine Corps, 7 September 2010
4. Our growing domestic insurgency: revolt of the generals, 6 October 2010

(f)  Posts about the training of officers:

1. Recommended reading: transforming the Army, the hard way, 15 January 2008 — Don Vandergriff, at the cutting edge of this struggle
2. 4GW: A solution of the third kind – Vandergriff is one of the few implementing real solutions.
3. About military leaders in the 21st century: “Theirs Is to Reason Why”, 1 July 2010
4. Preface to Manning the Future Legions of the United States: Finding and Developing Tomorrow’s Centurions, 16 July 2010
5. Training of officers, a key step for the forging of an effective military force, 17 July 2010
6. Dragging American Military Culture into the 21st Century, 13 August 2010
7. Building a new generation of visionary leaders for the US military, 30 September 2010