Later Wittgenstein

Arremeter contra sí mismo ante la comunidad filosófica que lo idolatraba,  contra su propia imagen, ya consagrada, tiene y requiere un gran valor. Se trata de aceptar que la filosofía es una obra siempre inacabada de trabajo crítico sobre uno mismo. Si se quiere una ética wittgensteiniana no es otra  que ésta: nunca  estés demasiado satisfecho contigo mismo. Por esta razón es que Wittgenstein se opone a la explicación causal como método en filosofía.  Porque tranquiliza, adormece. Envilece.

Es imposible escribir sobre uno mismo con más verdad que la que uno es, Esta es la diferencia en¬tre escribir sobre uno mismo y sobre los objetos exter¬nos. Se escribe sobre uno mismo tan alto como se está. No está uno sobre zancos o en una-escalera, sino sólo sobre los pies. 
. Esta dificultad para escribir con franqueza cuando uno es el objeto, también se presenta en el acto de leer e interpretar un texto cuando es un escrito que trastorna nuestras  creencias y  mitos identitarios. Frases irónicas y profundas  como las de Wittgenstein son difíciles de encontrar. Entre esos pocos se pueden nombrar con tranquilidad a Georg Lichtenberg cuando destroza a los eruditos y a la retórica irónica y despiadada de Marx  .
Incluiré un tercero luego, a Jonathan Swift,  que señala  a la sátira  como un curioso de espejo, porque quien lo sostiene descubre el rostro de todos, excepto el propio.  En este sentido la obra de wittgenstein es satírica y en esto radica su principal dificultad.

Preface This paper continues an enquiry into the example, exploring relations of general to particular, concept to percept, universal to instance, all active ingredients in the example-fact interaction. The example is essential to the basic architecture of the fact, and any fact requires examples, either explicit or implicit, to function as fact. The fact is built on the general concept present within a fact, present as a word with general reference, or a predicate attached to a name. Examples are the major resource in the 'meaning toolbox' and appear in many different forms. They are central to human practices across an incalculable number of life events, situations and practices-choices, decisions, plans, learning, explanations, warning, prohibitions, moral and political introspection are just a few. Central to this 'meaning dynamic' is the concept, a word of with general reference. The contrast between the concept and its examples is marked. The concept has been regarded, (in idealism) as present in the theoretical mental realm, while the example, is seen more as an expression (in empiricism) in a physical and sensory realm. This seems to hint at two distinct realms of intelligibility. However, a third realm, distinct from these two,

Humans are very wicked, after helping a friend of mine to be rich and famous. He went at my back to betray me. I was so sad and don't know what to do, then I stumbled online to see this great Dr AGADA. He helped me to kill this wicked friend of mine. Am so happy because I was fulfilled. Of you need any help or you are need of Death spell or Voodoo to kill just contact him.
Call/WhatsApp:+2348114081028
Email: dragada1199@gmail.com

کتاب قواعد و زبان خصوصی از نظر ویتگنشتاین تفسیری متفاوت با تفاسیر رایج از کتاب پژوهش‌های فلسفی عرضه می‌کند. در این تفسیر، مسئلة پیروی از قاعده محور اصلی کتاب پژوهش‌ها و استدلالی برای ناممکن بودن زبان خصوصی به شمار رفته است. کریپکی استدلال ویتگنشتاین را به شکل پاسخ به شکاکی صورت‌بندی کرده که می‌خواهد واقعیتی در ازاء معنای لفظ یا پیروی درست از قاعده به وی عرضه شود. ویتگنشتاینِ کریپکی، چنین مطالبه‌ای را نابجا می‌داند و مدعی است هنگامی می‌توان کاربرد لفظ یا قاعده‌ای را «درست» خواند که با کاربرد دیگر کاربران زبان یا قاعده توافق داشته باشد؛ جز این معیار دیگری برای ارزیابی نمی‌توان داد. تفسیر کریپکی از پرسش و پاسخ ویتگنشتاین مباحث فلسفی فراوانی را برانگیخته است که موضع‌گیری در آن‌ها ثمراتی مهم برای بسیاری از بحث‌ها در روش‌شناسی علوم انسانی دارد. این مقاله، نخست، گزارشی از چالش شکاکانة کریپکی و پاسخ آن به دست می‌دهد. سپس برخی تفسیرهای رقیب و نقدهایی که آن‌ها به تفسیر کریپکی وارد کرده‌اند مرور می‌شود. پس از آن، به تأثیرات این بحث در سایر مباحث فکری اشاره و نهایتاً به بررسی یکی از ترجمه‌های فارسی آن پرداخته خواهد شد.

In this paper, I critically examine Saul Kripke's unconventional interpretation of Wittgenstein. I focus on Kripke's claim that Wittgenstein formulated a skeptical paradox on language and also its skeptical solution. The correctness of Kripke's interpretation depends on the validity of this statement. I will show that in Philosophical Investigations there is no textual evidence for this claim. In the second stage of my argument, I will apply a Wittgensteinian "therapy" to the paradox of rule-following, based on a reading of On Certainty.

The aim of the work is to present the possibilities of ethics in late Wittgensteinian framework. In course of the investigation will be presented: (1) early Wittgensteinian ethics, (2) late Wittgensteinian anti-foundationalism and (3) its consequences for analytical meta-ethics – it will be argued (a) against epistemologization of ethics and (b) for need of more complex understanding of ethics, by which traditional meta-ethical disputes of realism with anti-realism and of cognitivism with non-cognitivism will be overcame –, which will result in (4) development of late Wittgensteinian ethics.
Ethics will be presented as consisting in ethical ways of seeing of the world, through which various phenomena arise as ethically relevant and late Wittgensteinian ethical investigation will be developed as clarification, cultivation and enrichment of our ethical ways of seeing in overall – partially subjective and partially intersubjective – context of language, life forms and life stories from which they arise.

This research deals, from my sight, with one of the most challenger matters in the contemporary Philosophy: Wittgenstein’s thought. As we know, in those days many fields of knowledge had already being touched by his ideas. Unfortunately, Sciences of Religion are still out of this broadness. In this field, Wittgenstein’s philosophy is still just a mere promise that never comes true.

Therefore, the aim of this work is to abandon the suspicion’s terrain and begin first steps toward a concrete advancing. I think solving the Wittgenstein’s puzzle makes Science of Religions walk in many new directions. However, we have here a first problem that in itself demands a lot of energy: Wittgenstein. In fact, talk about religion in Wittgenstein’s thought means talk about a central theme that is like a kernel in a pome. So to reach the kernel is first necessary to eat the whole fruit. Therefore, although I am nor an expert, neither a philosopher, I have been involved with exegetic problems in such intense way that was unavoidable that this monograph became a little wittgensteinian. What I mean is that it became interesting even to those who want to know some matters in Wittgenstein’s philosophy.

Besides this first wittgensteinian contribution, there is other, which consists in pointing out new directions to Science of Religion. But why speaking of pointing out and not of solving problems, like it was to wait in an academic work? The reason for that is that I am perhaps pioneering a new field of studies in Sciences of Religion, so I cannot do other than pointing out new directions in: Philosophy of religion and Theology concerning to the problem of religious language (epistemology) and concerning to theological concepts and methodology. Phenomenology of religion that can be retaken in the point R. Otto left it. Psychology of religion and the problem of magic that Wittgenstein’s trying to take out from epistemology and putting it in this field. And finally, a new field that I call here an ordinary philosophy of religious language, which should deal with a kind of transcendental religious language not necessarily sublime.

Summing up, an entire New World should be approached by Wittgenstein’s leading. This work, for its pioneering, is only offering a signpost to others pathfinders. May others come and open new roads.

Περίληψη Στο παρόν άρθρο διερευνάται ο τρόπος λειτουργίας φιλοσοφικών ζητημάτων στην καθημερινή πρακτική. Αφορμή της άνωθεν πρόθεσης αποτελεί η ταινία Face Off (1997) του σκηνοθέτη John Woo. Η υπόθεση συνοπτικά αναφέρεται στην αμοιβαία μεταφορά και αντικατάσταση των φυσικών προσώπων δύο ατόμων μέσω χειρουργικής επέμβασης, ενός αστυνομικού (Άρτσερ) και ενός εγκληματία (Κάστορ). Η ταινία θέτει το ζήτημα της απώλειας της προσωπικής ταυτότητας και των νέων ρόλων που οι χαρακτήρες μετέρχονται. Σύντομα, γίνεται κατανοητό πως η αλλαγή προσώπου δεν αλλοιώνει σημαντικά τον πραγματικό χαρακτήρα και τις έξεις των ηρώων, αντίθετα τον επεκτείνει και τον επαναθεμελιώνει μέσα από τις νέες κοινωνικές συνθήκες που οι ήρωες έχουν να αντιμετωπίσουν. Από την άλλη πλευρά όμως, είναι πιθανό λόγω διακύβευσης της προσωπικής ταυτότητας να οδηγηθούμε σ' έναν περαιτέρω προβληματισμό για τη συγκρότηση και τη λειτουργία της έννοιας της συνείδησης. Εν τέλει, και οι δύο ήρωες παίζουν το ίδιο κοινωνικό παιχνίδι της εξουσίας βασισμένο στη βία, καθότι αυτή δεν έχει πρόσωπο. Η βία αυτή φανερώνει μια κοινωνία σε ηθική κρίση, όπου οι πρακτικές ενός εγκληματία και ενός αστυνομικού ομοιάζουν, με αποτέλεσμα η συμπεριφορά του εγκληματία με το πρόσωπο του αστυνομικού να γίνεται αποδεκτή από το κοινωνικό συγκείμενο για αρκετό χρονικό διάστημα. Από την άλλην, ο ασεβής και ανερμάτιστος Κάστορ οφείλει να βάλει μια τάξη στην οικογενειακή και επαγγελματική του ζωή ως Άρτσερ, ενώ ο εσωστρεφής και καταθλιπτικός Άρτσερ, ως Κάστορ πρέπει να περισώσει την εγκληματική του ομάδα από το κυνήγι του νόμου: διαφορετικοί άνθρωποι οφείλουν όχι μόνο να ενδυθούν μια νέα ταυτότητα αλλά κυρίως να συνεχίσουν να πράττουν και να μιλούν εντός μια διαμορφωμένης μορφής ζωής, την οποία δεν έχουν διαμορφώσει οι ίδιοι. Πέρα από τα ποικίλα αφηγηματικά και δραματουργικά δάνεια που έχει η ταινία από τον Όμηρο και τη χριστιανοεβραϊκή παράδοση, τελικός στόχος της ταινίας είναι να δείξει την αναγέννηση του εαυτού μέσα από την ίδια την απώλειά του. Μια μάχη καλού και κακού που «μόνο μαζί είναι ικανά να υπάρχουν διαιρεμένα». Abstract This article examines how philosophical issues function in everyday practice. The reason for the above intention is the director John Woo's film Face Off (1997). The case briefly refers to the mutual transfer and replacement of two faces by surgery, the faces of a police officer (Archer) and a criminal (Castor). The film raises the issue of the loss of personal identity and the new roles that characters have to play after this loss. Soon, it becomes clear that changing the face does not significantly alter the true character of the heroes, instead expanding and re-establishing it through the new social conditions that the heroes have to deal with. On the other hand, however, it is possible that due to the endangerment of personal identity, we may be led to further reflection on the conception and functioning of the concept of consciousness. After all, both heroes play the same social game of power based on violence, since violence has no face. This violence reveals a society in moral crisis, where the practices of a criminal and a police officer are alike, resulting in the criminal's behavior with the officer's face being accepted by the social context for some time. On the other hand, the disrespectful and unethical Castor has to put order in his

We outline here a certain history of ideas concerning the relation between intuitions and their external verification and consider its potential for detrivializing the concept of virtuality. From Descartes and Leibniz onward to 19th-century geometry and the concept of "invariant" that it shares with 19th-century psychology, we follow the thread of what might be informally called an "opera-tional" conception of the virtual, an intuition progressively developed in the 20th century from of group theoretical thinking into "functorial" thinking (in the context of category theory), and eventually intuitions for the concept of "univalence" (homotopy type theory) and its implications for the meaning of equality and identity. At each turn, skeptical arguments haunt this history's modes of exteriorization, proof, and verification; we consider the later Wittgenstein's worries concerning rule following and the apparent unbridgeable gap between formal theory and informal practice. We show how the development of mathematical intuitions and formalisms in the last century and the discovery of deep connection between intuitionistic logic and computation have begun to respond to some of these concerns and favour a conception of virtuality that is operational, constructive, pragmatic, and hospitible to scientific detrivialization.

What does it mean for ethics to say, as Wittgenstein did, that philosophy “leaves everything as it is”?

Though clearly absorbed with ethical questions throughout his life and work, Wittgenstein's remarks about the subject do not easily lend themselves to summation or theorizing. Although many moral philosophers cite the influence or inspiration of Wittgenstein, there is little agreement about precisely what it means to do ethics in the light of Wittgenstein.

Ethics after Wittgenstein brings together an international cohort of leading scholars in the field to address this problem. The chapters advance a conception of philosophical ethics characterized by an attention to detail, meaning and importance which itself makes ethical demands on its practitioners. Working in conversation with literature and film, engaging deeply with anthropology and critical theory, and addressing contemporary problems from racialized sexual violence against women to the Islamic State, these contributors reclaim Wittgenstein's legacy as an indispensable resource for contemporary ethics.

Wittgenstein’s theory of meaning as use proffers useful tools to grasp a better understanding of the epistemic challenges for legal systems that value the objectivity and uniformity of their jurisdiction. The biggest challenge for such legal systems is posed by legal uncertainty (which describes a legal system in which verdicts are not fixed by legislation alone, but also (for example) by ‘unlawful’ considerations of judges). I develop a Wittgensteinian solution which enables us to avoid legal uncertainty and consider three possibilities to deal with its (partial) cause: the influence of social/cultural value systems on the meaning of words in utterances.

The lingering mystery of John Rawls’s reflective equilibrium is that its nature is unclear. Rawls at times suggests he is merely describing people’s conceptions of justice, whereas at other times he implies that his reflective equilibrium is a way to justify his conception of justice. Faced with seemingly conflictual passages, most scholars privilege the justificatory ones. However, I argue that this is not an effective strategy because understanding how the descriptive and justificatory aspects of reflective equilibrium fit together is the key to unlocking its nature and actual force. This paper compares Rawls’s method to the philosophical method of later Wittgenstein in his so-called private language argument to argue how the descriptive and justificatory aspects of Rawls’s reflective equilibrium fit together. In my view, both philosophers’ methods are descriptive clarifications of our unclear conceptions. However, their clarification is not just descriptive; they also aim at their readers achieving enlightenment. Importantly, I argue, that enlightenment offers us justification of the conception resulting from their clarification. Hence, their methods are justificatory as well. Finally, I claim that this way of understanding reflective equilibrium makes us realise how Rawls could respond to a prominent objection to it.

Nel 1949 Wittgenstein stava lavorando all’ultima parte delle Ricerche filosofiche e durante una conversazione con Maurice Drury disse: «Nel libro mi è impossibile dire una sola parola su tutto quello che la musica ha significato nella mia vita. Come posso sperare allora di essere capito?».
In realtà l’importanza della musica è testimoniata dal fatto che negli scritti di Wittgenstein è presente una notevole quantità di osservazioni filosofiche e di riflessioni estetiche sul linguaggio musicale.
Il libro di Piero Niro propone un’indagine sul significato di queste osservazioni e affronta il problema wittgensteiniano dei «limiti del linguaggio» collegandolo alla crisi del linguaggio musicale determinata dalle avanguardie nel Novecento. Da questa indagine possono scaturire le ipotesi per la definizione di una estetica musicale wittgensteiniana.

Dalla Presentazione di Brian McGuinness:
[...] Nell’interessante trattazione di questi e altri argomenti, Piero Niro nota che il conservatorismo musicale di Wittgenstein mal si concilia con le idee del filosofo sulla libertà creativa, per quanto riguarda le regole del linguaggio. Il suo pensiero (ma non il suo gusto) sembra intonato piuttosto alle idee e al lavoro di Schönberg.
[...] A mio giudizio la lezione più importante che traiamo dal libro di Piero Niro è la dimostrazione della capacità di Wittgenstein di stabilire in ogni àmbito, in ogni mondo, un discorso appropriato, capace di verificare il senso e la mancanza di senso (o l’equivalenza tra le due cose). Non esiste una regola assoluta, né un modello matematico o fisico necessario ed esclusivo. Soprattutto, nessuna teoria. Ma anche il fatto che non c’è una teoria onnicomprensiva, allora, deve essere stabilito caso per caso.

(Excerpt from Foreword by Brian McGuinness:
[…] In his interesting discussion of these and related topics, Piero Niro points out that Wittgenstein’s conservatism as regards music sits ill with his ideas about creative freedom as regards language-rules. His thought (but not his taste) corresponds with the doctrines and practice of Schönberg.
[…] To my own mind the most important lesson to be learnt from Piero Niro’s book is the success with which (as he shows) Wittgenstein establishes within each area, each world as I have hinted above, a discourse appropriate to it, which guarantees its own sense and nonsense (or the equivalent). There is no single rule, no model in mathematics or natural science, that has to be followed. Above all no theory. But that there is none is not a theory either – it has to be seen from case to case.)

Table of Contents: Presentazione di Brian McGuinness - I. Introduzione - II. I riferimenti alla notazione musicale, al «linguaggio delle note» e al «pensiero musicale» presenti nel Tractatus logico-philosophicus e nei Quaderni 1914-1916 - III. Osservazioni filosofiche e riflessioni estetiche sul linguaggio musicale negli scritti successivi al Tractatus logico-philosophicus - IV. Il problema dei limiti del linguaggio e la crisi scaturita dalle ricerche delle avanguardie musicali nel Novecento - V. Annotazioni per un’estetica musicale wittgensteiniana - Osservazioni conclusive - Bibliografia delle opere citate - Indice dei nomi

N.B. Parfois, la note de bas de page est une nécessité. Le contrepoids aussi. Il paraît que sur internet, une stèle de Ludwig Wittgenstein existe. Pour certains, c’est non-seulement une anecdote sémiologique, mais également une forme Complément-mémoire basé sur l'esthétique relationnelle. Nous y reviendrons dans le courant du Texte-épreuve à venir. Nous espérons avoir été suffisamment explicite dans ce Texte-épreuve d’introduction.

Note : le terme In extenso en matière de sémiologie, de sémiologie (C.f. wittgensteinian duck- rabbit diagram), et de sémiologie de l'image (Cf. Carnets annexes : Figure 1) .
Celle de Wittgenstein sans note de bas de page ( C.F. Carnets annexes : Figure 1 Figure 9 : Cradle-to-cradle. Ceci n’est pas une nécessité humaine. Mais plutôt : une pure métaphysique dans la mesure ou le contrepoids que L.W. peut apporter en incarnant une forme d'ekphrasis du diagramme wittgenstienien du duck-rabbit dans le Texte-épreuve à venir.
Ou comment passer du symbolisme d’un mot à la genèse d’une pratique. La syntaxe ayant pour but de servir de modèle Wittgensteinien pour éviter toute forme de débordements au sein du champs de recherche-continuité du T.L.P.. Là est le questionnement Wittgensteinien in extenso, car il faut une parfaite corrélation entre le ici et maintenant d’une part; et la référence philosophique et sémiologique du langage mise en place d’autre part. La structure analogue au schéma Post-wittgensteinien que nous tentons de vous exposer ici est une forme de simple symbole, mais aussi une forme de symbolisme tentant de ne pas se soumettre au non-sens de certaines situations in situ (C.F. Carnets annexes : Figure 7 : Annexe figure 1 : Michel Foucault, les mots et les choses, Paris, Gallimard, 2009, pp. 186-187). Si l'homme du continu contemporain est complexe, c’est pour la simple et bonne raison que dans la situation Analogue au schéma Post-wittgensteinien actuelle, la notion de construction d’une forme-relation apparenté à la forme de la représentation que le médium image implique devient soit vrai soit faussé. Et parce que chaque relation implique une relation de représentation d’un objet, l’image et l’esthétique qu’elle revendique ne peuvent pas être vues sous une relation philosophique autrement que complexité incarnée, et cela à pour objet toute la question de l’investigation de l’opérateur. Par exemple : l’ossature d’une conversation commence à se constituer lorsque l’on posera la forme suivante : « D’où venez-vous? » ou/alias « Dites-nous qui vous incarnez? » Seraient alors posées les premières questions par rapport aux champs théoriques, comme des sortes de maïeutiques (C.f. Carnets annexes : Figure 40) que l’ont ne peut éluder. Exemples de recherche au sein de ce texte si l’on se réfère à la frontière (C.f. Carnets annexes : Figure 32, Carnets annexes : Figure 41) après Ludwig Wittgenstein.
Le signifiant au sein du Pretium Doloris implique une
in situ. Les signifiés demanderont donc une forme-objet, et ce au sein d’une installation proposition. L’inférence impliquée via le système photographique représenté au sein du champs d’investigation et de transparence du savoir ici est la suivante : ou comment faire en sorte que chaque scène soit le fruit de l’appartenance au milieu Wittgensteinien de la philosophie appliquée au sein du champs de l’art; et ce sans être vague (C.f. Carnets annexes : Figure 42) : ou d’investigation des data au sein du médium de l’exposition : fait-référence implicite et non exprimé, et in extenso, de la référence philosophique et sémiologique du langage à laquelle chaque texte fait référence implicitement au diagramme Wittgensteinien duck-rabbit. Le choix de chaque référence est logiquement une forme de symbolisme, mais aussi de maïeutique complexe que l’on peut voir comme étant donnée d’une importance cruciale, il faut donc adopter une forme de correspondance entre les relations de travail, et ce sans faire l’économie d’une volonté de mise en relations post-wittgensteinnienne de la forme. Il faudrait admettre que l’essence de chaque élément implique une forme de frontière, c’est la raison pour laquelle il est nécessaire de se poser des questions sur la position de chaque terme (C.f. Carnets annexes : Figure 43) dans un système post-wittgenstein. Système qui impliquerait de devoir énumérer chaque référence pour que chaque objet soit à prendre en compte ou comme étant des formes de choix de croyances intrinsèques (C.f. Carnets annexes : Figure 44).


Keywords: sémiologie : Ludwig Wittgenstein, philosophy, Conceptual Art, Vienna Circle