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Evolutionary epistemology as a scientific method: a new look upon the units and levels of evolution debate

Theory in Biosciences volume 129, pages167–182(2010)Cite this article

Abstract

Evolutionary epistemology can provide a unified scientific methodology that enables scholars to study the evolution of life as well as the evolution of cognition, science, culture and any other phenomenon displayed by living organisms. In this article, three heuristics are provided that allow for a thorough search for the units, levels and mechanisms of evolution. Contrary to previous approaches, units, levels and mechanisms are not identified by pointing out essential features, but rather ostensive definitions are preferred. That is, units are considered as such if a level of evolution and a mechanism of evolution is identifiable. Levels are levels if one can point out units that evolve at that level according to evolutionary mechanisms, and mechanisms are considered as such if one can point out units and levels where the mechanism is active.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    The Baldwin and ratchet effect can to a certain extent be comprehended from within selectionist approaches, yet certain aspects of these mechanisms extend and complement mere selectionist views.

  2. 2.

    Either intuitively or experimentally.

  3. 3.

    That a unit of evolution might also be a mechanism of evolution sounds strange, but given the multiplicity of the evolutionary mechanisms that exist, and given the fact that we do not know what a unit can be, this, nevertheless, needs to be a possibility that is taken into consideration.

  4. 4.

    The environment evolves differently because of the emergence of the phenotype (as, e.g. demonstrated by niche construction, Lewontin 2000), but it did not evolve ‘for’ the phenotype before the latter was present.

  5. 5.

    Which does not necessarily imply that the mechanism itself is constantly active. However, when it is active, the same conditions must be present.

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Acknowledgements

My warm thanks are extended to Olga Pombo for inviting me to organise the Lisbon conference. I am also very grateful for the help I got in this endeavour from my co-organizers Helena Abreu, Francisco Carrapiço, André Levy and Marco Pina. I acknowledge the financial support received from the Portuguese Fund for Science and Technology (the FACC). I am indebted to all contributors for making the volumes what they are. Finally, I want to sincerely thank the editors-in-chief of Theory in Biosciences for providing us with a good home for our proceedings.

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Affiliations

  1. Fund for Science and Technology, Portugal (FCT), Centre for Philosophy of Science, Universidade de Lisboa, Lisbon, Portugal
    • Nathalie Gontier
  2. Marie Curie Outgoing Research Fellow, Centre for Logic and Philosophy of Science, Vrije Universiteit Brussel, Pleinlaan 2, 1050, Brussels, Belgium
    • Nathalie Gontier
  3. Division of Palaeontology, American Museum of Natural History, New York, NY, USA
    • Nathalie Gontier
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Gontier, N. Evolutionary epistemology as a scientific method: a new look upon the units and levels of evolution debate. Theory Biosci. 129, 167–182 (2010). https://doi.org/10.1007/s12064-010-0085-9

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Keywords

  • Evolutionary epistemology
  • Units
  • Levels
  • Evolutionary mechanisms