Informal Logic

On the occasion of the start of the talk show season on Dutch national television, Wagemans was invited to analyze rhetorical manoeuvres in an exemplary talk show debate broadcasted during the previous season. The infamous debate was about measurements taken by soccer clubs to prevent young players of Moroccan origin from joining the club. Wagemans' comments were incorporated in an article written by Haro Kraak that was published in the Dutch national newspaper De Volkskrant.

Read the online version of the article (in Dutch) at http://www.volkskrant.nl/televisie/waarom-stelt-een-talkshowdebat-vaak-teleur~a4361810/?hash=d3fa230f78fe7f191436103f228398351596a5a7.

Qualitative research is one of the most widespread approaches in social research; however, this way of doing research still receives pungent criticisms of the soundness of its results and on the rightfulness of the extension of their scope. All these reprimands are frequently framed within a more general criticism that refers to qualitative research’s lack of rigour, moving from the tacit idea that the only possible form of rigour is that of quantitative research.
On the issue of rigour in qualitative research, there have been two main positions: the post-modernist refusal of this notion, accused of “method-o-centrism”, and the search for a version of rigour alternative to quantitative research. The mainstream in this last path is represented by the diverse versions of Grounded Theory. GT pursues the goal of rigour through an interesting, although questionable, process of sampling (theoretical saturation) and through a codified procedure for data analysis.
The proposal advanced in this webinar goes in the same direction, but with a different gait. The frame proposed for conferring rigour to qualitative research is that of the theory of argumentation, thought as the equivalent, in our territory, of the theory of probability which guide quantitative research. In this perspective, carrying out qualitative research can be thought as a construction of an argument with which we defend the soundness of the research results and the rightfulness of their extension from studied to analogous unstudied cases. The defence of the research results soundness is underpinned on a set of propositional commitments, a set of theoretical assumptions which works as premises of the in-progress argument. Continuously challenged by a dialectical disposition, typical of main contemporary theory of argumentation schools, these propositional commitments mould the plausibility of the conclusions reached (conditional plausibility). Some operative tools for these purposes will be presented, namely, the proleptic argumentation and a set of argumentation schemes, all equipped with a set of critical questions. All these tools combine a logical and semantic dimension, and this aspect will be illustrated through the presentation of one of the most common reasoning in qualitative research, based on the argument from analogy. We use the argument from analogy (usually a theory-laden version of it), both during the fieldwork and the deskwork to invent categories and to build metaphors (the qualitative equivalent of the quantitative statistical models).

One result of successful argumentation-able arguers presenting cogent arguments to competent audiences-is a transfer of credibility from premises to conclusions. From a purely logical perspective, neither dubious premises nor fallacious inference should lower the credibility of the target conclusion. Nevertheless, some arguments do backfire this way. Dialectical and rhetorical considerations come into play. Three interrelated conclusions emerge from a catalogue of hapless arguers and backfiring arguments. First, there are advantages to paying attention to arguers and their contexts, rather than focusing narrowly on their arguments, in order to understand what can go wrong in argumentation. Traditional fallacy identification, with its exclusive attention to faulty inferences, is inadequate to explain the full range of argumentative failures. Second, the notion of an Ideal Arguer can be defined by contrast with her less than ideal peers to serve as a useful tool in argument evaluation. And third, not all of the ways that arguers raise doubts about their conclusions are pathological. On the contrary, some ways that doubts are raised concerning our intended conclusions are an integral part of ideal argumentative practice.

Qualitative research is one of the most widespread approaches in social research; however, this way of doing research still receives pungent criticisms of the soundness of its results and on the rightfulness of the extension of their scope. All these reprimands are frequently framed within a more general criticism that refers to qualitative research's lack of rigour, moving from the tacit idea that the only possible form of rigour is that of quantitative research. On the issue of rigour in qualitative research, there have been two main positions: the post-modernist refusal of this notion, accused of "method-o-centrism", and the search for a version of rigour alternative to quantitative research. The mainstream in this last path is represented by the diverse versions of Grounded Theory. GT pursues the goal of rigour through an interesting, although questionable, process of sampling (theoretical saturation) and through a codified procedure for data analysis. The proposal advanced in this webinar goes in the same direction, but with a different gait. The frame proposed for conferring rigour to qualitative research is that of the theory of argumentation, thought as the equivalent, in our territory, of the theory of probability which guide quantitative research. In this perspective, carrying out qualitative research can be thought as a construction of an argument with which we defend the soundness of the research results and the rightfulness of their extension from studied to analogous unstudied cases. The defence of the research results soundness is underpinned on a set of propositional commitments, a set of theoretical assumptions which works as premises of the in-progress argument. Continuously challenged by a dialectical disposition, typical of main contemporary theory of argumentation schools, these propositional commitments mould the plausibility of the conclusions reached (conditional plausibility). Some operative tools for these purposes will be presented, namely, the proleptic argumentation and a set of argumentation schemes, all equipped with a set of critical questions. All these tools combine a logical and semantic dimension, and this aspect will be illustrated through the presentation of one of the most common reasoning in qualitative research, based on the argument from analogy. We use the argument from analogy (usually a theory-laden version of it), both during the fieldwork and the deskwork to invent categories and to build metaphors (the qualitative equivalent of the quantitative statistical models).

COURSE DESCRIPTION
Critical Thinking is an examination of the basic elements of logic, including the study of the principles of inductive and deductive reasoning, their relevance to problem-solving, scientific method, and argument analysis/evaluation. Development of critical thinking skills, including identifying and evaluating arguments, recognizing informal fallacies, and the uses and misuses of language in a variety of contexts. Integration of critical thinking skills with the techniques of effective argumentative writing, addressing themes of social and multicultural relevance.

A central theme running through the course this semester will be the analysis of concepts such as “post-truth”, “skepticism”, “relativism” (and similar phrases like “everything is relative”, “who’s to say what is right?”, “everyone is entitled to their own opinion”), “reasonability”, and “rationality”. Another central theme, perhaps unexpectedly, will be the conceptual analysis of “bullshit.” In fact, there will be a significant amount of time spent on just what bullshit is, and why there is so much of it, in particular with respect to the proliferation of insidious conspiracy theories. We will apply the tools of logic learned in this class to real world problems—problems which are caused or at least made worse by poor thinking. It is not environmental catastrophe, economic collapse, nuclear holocaust, terrorism, or pandemics, for example, that pose the greatest threat to humanity. It is irrationality, as that is what underlies ALL of the aforementioned issues, and many more. So, in short, one of the goals of this class is to save humanity. We will also learn how to write a great argumentative paper for any class you take.

Informal logic, is faced with the problematic of persuasive arguments in contexts where evidence is rich, diverse and preferentially selected on the basis of pre-established attitudes. This requires that the standard view of challenge by presenting inconsistent evidence be rethought. In this paper, I will argue that the solution is to focus less on evidence that contradicts claims and to confront the network of warrants that support the selecting and evaluating of evidentiary moves.

Three Amsterdam philosophers and a programmer have an ambitious plan: to develop an argumentation machine that helps to recognize false reasoning from speeches by Donald Trump or Greta Thunberg, for example. Interview by Maarten van Gestel.

Read the online version of the article (in Dutch) via http://volkskrant.nl/a-b77a1a75.

The Argument Type Identification Procedure (ATIP) aims to facilitate the identification of arguments expressed in natural language in terms of the argument categorisation framework of the Periodic Table of Arguments (PTA). Such identification prepares the ground for an assessment of the quality of the argument under scrutiny. In this document, the various steps of the procedure are explained and illustrated through an example. The procedure starts with a functional analysis of the elements of the two statements that have been recognized as the ‘conclusion’ and the ‘premise’ of the argument and results in labelling it with a type indicator that systematically summarises its characteristics.

ÖZET Eleştirel Düşünme (ED) her ne kadar biçimsel olmayan mantıktan temel alsa da kendisine özgü bir içeriği haizdir. ED'nin, bu içeriğin yanı sıra kendine özgü birtakım öndayanakları da bulunur. Sözkonusu öndayanakların önemli bir bölümü mantık dışı bir karakterde olsa da mantıksal incelemenin sağlıklı yürütülebilmesi için bu öndayanakların ele alınması önem arz etmektedir. Bu çalışmada, bu öndayanakların ve koşulların neler olduğu gerekçeleriyle birlikte ortaya koyulacaktır. Çalışma, biçimsel olmayan mantıkta rastlanmayan öndayanaklarla sınırlı tutulacaktır. Dolayısıyla, esasen, tartışmaya dair koşullar ve argümanın soyutlanmasına dair koşullar ele alınacaktır. Tartışmaya dair koşullar, pragmatik ve semantik koşullardan oluşmaktadır. Argümanın soyutlanmasına dair koşullarsa hayırseverlik ilkesi, sadakat ilkesi ve bu iki ilkenin uygulanması bakımından kritik önemdeki bağlamsal ve dilsel farkındalıktır. Tüm bunların yanı sıra, belirli bir düzeyde de olsa rasyonel bir özne ED bakımından can alıcı önemdedir. Rasyonel öznenin rasyonellik düzeyi ayrıca ele alınmakta ve gerekli düzey, asgari rasyonellik düzeyiyle ifade edilmektedir. Bu kapsamda, Suvar Köseraif'in ortaya koyduğu bir sorun ele alınmakta ve bu sorunun esasen argümanın soyutlanmasıyla, özellikle de dilsel ve bağlamsal farkındalıkla ilgili olduğu ileri sürülmektedir. Anahtar Kelimeler: Eleştirel düşünme, argümanı soyutlamak, argümanı değerlendirmek, tartışma, biçimsel olmayan mantık, öndayanak ABSTRACT Critical Thinking (CT) has a peculiar content, though it stems from informal logic. Moreover, CT also has several presuppositions, all of which are peculiar to CT. A significant number of these presuppositions are of a nonlogical character. Yet in order to continue the logical analysis in a sound way, it is crucial to take these presuppositions into account. In this paper, these presuppositions and preconditions will be set forth together with the reasons for identifying them. The paper is restricted to the presuppositions which are not found in informal logic. Hence, essentially the preconditions regarding the debate and the preconditions regarding the abstraction of the argument will be the topics of consideration. The preconditions regarding the debate consist of pragmatic and semantic preconditions. In contrast, the preconditions regarding the abstraction of the argument are the principle of charity, the principle of loyalty, and linguistic and contextual awareness, which are all crucial for the application of these two

The recent publication of the books La razionalità, by Paolo Labinaz, and I modi della razionalità, edited by Massimo Dell'Utri and Antonio Rainone, offers the opportunity to provide an overview of some important discussions on rationality. In particular, I highlight how the modern and Cartesian ideal of this notion is undergoing a transformation that is enhanced by results coming from empirical studies in the field of cognitive science. These transformations are visible in many ambits concerning rationality: this discussion privileges the traditional ones, i.e., logical, theoretical, and practical rationality.