Medieval Arabic Philosophy

Historians of medieval Islamic philosophy have traditionally construed Avicenna as using intuition in exclusively one place in his philosophical system, that is, where he uses the concept of ḥads (the instantaneous discovery of the middle term). In this paper, I question this narrow interpretation from an analytic perspective and show that the concept of ḥads is not the singular place where Avicenna utilizes intuition as understood in analytic epistemology. First, I provide a brief exposition of intuition in analytic epistemology. Then I survey Avicenna’s main epistemological works, searching for any occasion where he employs intuition as understood in analytic epistemology. I survey a major work on logic (Deliverance: Logic), two major works on philosophical psychology (De Anima of The Healing and De Anima of The Deliverance), and a compact philosophical summa (Remarks and Admonitions). I find that Avicenna uses intuition in three other places in his system. These are (i) his claim that we can acquire real essences by abstraction or emanation, (ii) his claim that the ‘flying man’ in his eponymous thought experiment immediately understands, without any sensory experience, that he exists, and (iii) his claim that we know the first principles of demonstrations as certain truths. Finally, I argue that these three uses of intuition is more consequential than ḥads, as by the former three Avicenna claims to acquire substantive knowledge while by ḥads the deductive knowledge gained doesn’t add anything substantively new to the premises of deduction.

Keywords: intuition, Avicenna, medieval Islamic epistemology, analytic philosophy

2 Introduction and practice of science. While the positivists argued for a spontaneous, steady and continuous growth of scientific knowledge the post-positivists make a strong case for a fundamental discontinuity in the development of science which can only be explained by ...

In this text, two notions described in two works by Al-Ġazālī are analyzed: the notion of “precipitance” (Arabic: tahafut) and “attachment to authority” (Arabic: taqlīd), which are described in Tahafut al-falasifa (English: The Precipitance of the Philosophers) and Al-Munqid min al-dalal (English: Rescuer from Error). I try to show that Al-Ġazālī in his criticism of philosophy focused not only on theoretical issues, but that one of the key parts of his criticism are practical issues concerning the philosophers’ way of life. Pointing to specific examples of using the two aforementioned concepts to overthrow philosophy, I propose a different interpretation of these two late works by Al-Ġazālī. Whole book: https://www.wuw.pl/product-pol-12401-Truth-and-Falsehood-in-Science-and-the-Arts-PDF.html

Invited talk for "Macrocosms and Microcosms: From Late Antiquity to the Middle Ages," University of Cambridge, 24th - 26th September, 2021.

The map of the pre-modern world, Asia, Africa, and Europe, is drawn collectively in the shape of a bird and fits with the Islamic Neoplatonic conception of the bird as the ultimate mediator between God and his people in communication with the cosmos and God’s angels through the process of emanation. The meaning of the bird in the map is explained through the Neoplatonic doctrine of Emanation (fayd) and the way in which it creates a link between man and God: microcosm to macrocosm.

In Neoplatonic philosophy, the rational soul is symbolized as a bird. When deprived of its natural intellectual ability (symbolized by the ability to fly), the bird/soul falls captive to the instincts and passions of the lower faculties of the animal soul. Imprisoned by the physical demands of matter, it is condemned to endless exile among the desolate wastelands and meaningless signposts of microcosmic earthly existence. At a larger collective metaphoric level, the bird/dove/pigeon symbolizes the plight of the rational souls of all humanity and therefore it can be used as a metaphorical representation for the world.

But the bird can forget its nets and cages and learn to fly again. In this sense, the bird also symbolizes redemption and the possibility of return to the macrocosmic Universal Intellect. It is thus not surprising to find that the bird is an oft-repeated motif in Islamicate culture with a multitude of meanings related to the bird’s reflection of soul and its ability to be closer to the heavens and God.

Abstract

Analytic philosophy triggered a methodological transformation in the study of the history of philosophy. This has led to a gradual adoption of philosophical approaches by the historians of medieval philosophy toward the history of medieval Latin philosophy, going beyond the previous historical approaches. However, a similar shift has not yet occurred in the historiography of medieval Islamic philosophy. The study of medieval Islamic philosophical works almost exclusively by historical approaches precludes these works from being better understood and some problems in this field from being fruitfully solved. One such problem is whether Avicenna’s epistemology is rationalist or empirical, which has created a longstanding debate among historians. I use the critical (rational) reconstruction approach to resolve this debate, and design my solution as a case study of applying this approach and showing its efficiency in solving the problems of the historiography of Islamic philosophy and gaining a deeper understanding of medieval Islamic philosophical works.

Bringing together an empirical perspective and analytic methodology, this approach enables us to notice the epistemological crisis in medieval Islamic thought. I argue that the debate on Avicenna’s epistemology is only one manifestation of this crisis. To resolve the debate, I first flesh out the basic theses and supplementary elements of rationalism and empiricism by using the resources of analytic philosophy, and I argue that empiricism provides better solutions to the problems of epistemology than rationalism does. I then investigate whether Avicenna is committed to any rationalist theses or elements. In the end, I find him to be a strong rationalist. Finally I propose two suggestions: (i) A research program should be created that does historiography of Islamic philosophy by using the philosophical approaches (the critical reconstruction approach in particular) to find out how much philosophical truth there is in medieval Islamic philosophical works. (ii) The epistemological crisis ongoing in contemporary Islamic thought can and should be solved by a move toward empiricism.

Keywords: Islamic philosophy, analytic philosophy, epistemological crisis, Avicenna’s epistemology, empiricism, rationalism

Özet

Analitik felsefenin felsefe tarihyazımı alanında tetiklediği metodolojik dönüşüm Ortaçağ Latin felsefe tarihinin tarihsel yaklaşımlardan ziyade gittikçe artan oranda felsefi yaklaşımlarla çalışılması sonucunu doğurmuştur. Ancak aynı dönüşüm İslam felsefe tarihyazımında henüz yaşanmamıştır. Ortaçağ Müslüman filozofların eserlerinin hala neredeyse tamamen tarihsel yaklaşımlarla incelenmesi onların daha iyi anlaşılmasını engellemekte ve bu alandaki bazı problemlerin çözülememesine neden olmaktadır. Tarihçiler arasında İbn Sina epistemolojisinin rasyonalist mi empirik mi olduğuna dair tartışma bu problemlerden biridir. Tartışmayı sonuca kavuşturmak için bu çalışmada eleştirel yeniden-inşa yaklaşımı kullanılmıştır. Böylece sözkonusu problemin çözümü bu yaklaşımın İslam felsefe tarihyazımının problemlerini çözme ve Ortaçağ Müslüman filozofların eserlerini daha iyi anlamada ne kadar başarılı olduğunu gösterecek bir vaka incelemesi olarak tasarlanmıştır.

Empirik perspektif ve analitik metodolojiyi birleştiren bu yaklaşım Ortaçağ İslam dünyasındaki epistemolojik krizi farketmemizi sağlar. Bu çalışmada sözkonusu tartışmanın bu krizin tek bir yansıması olduğu ileri sürülmüştür. Tartışmayı sonuca kavuşturmak için öncelikle analitik felsefenin kaynakları kullanılarak rasyonalizm ve empirizmin temel tezleri ve tamamlayıcı unsurları tespit edilmiş, empirizmin epistemolojinin temel problemlerine nispeten daha iyi çözümler sunduğu iddia edilmiştir. Sonra İbn Sina epistemolojisinde bu rasyonalist unsurların bulunup bulunmadığı araştırılmış ve nihayet İbn Sina’nın güçlü derecede rasyonalist olduğu saptanmıştır. En son bu bulgunun uzanımı olarak iki öneride bulunulmuştur: (i) Ortaçağlı Müslüman filozofların eserlerinde ne kadar felsefi doğru bulunduğunu tespit etmek için İslam felsefe tarihini felsefi yaklaşımlar (özellikle eleştirel yeniden-inşa yaklaşımı) ile inceleyen bir araştırma programı oluşturulmalıdır. (ii) Çağdaş İslam düşüncesinde devam etmekte olan epistemolojik kriz empirizm ile çözülebilir ve çözülmelidir.

Keywords: İslam felsefesi, analitik felsefe, epistemolojik kriz, İbn Sina epistemolojisi, empirizm, rasyonalizm

مسئله هراس از مرگ از مسائلی است که  از یک‌سو در تاریخ فلسفه و از سوی دیگر، در تاریخ و اخلاق پزشکی مورد توجه اندیشمندان قرار گرفته است. از گذشته علاوه بر آثار ادبی و نگاه‌های اسطوره‌ای منعکس‌شده در داستان‌ها و نمایشنامه‌ها و متون عرفانی و غنوصی، فیلسوفان نیز نتایج اندیشه‌ ورزی خود را در این خصوص در آثار فلسفی منعکس کرده‌اند. در یونان باستان، در کنار اندیشه‌ ورزی‌های سقراط و افلاطون، اپیکوری‌ها و رواقی‌ها نیز در فلسفه‌ ورزی در زمینه هراس از مرگ سهم بسزایی داشته‌اند. در جهان اسلام نیز اندیشمندانی همچون محمد زکریای رازی و ابوعلی مسکویه و ملاصدرا در اینباره سخن گفته‌اند. امّا در این میان، تنها تک‌نگاری موجود در زمینه هراس از مرگ که به تفصیل این موضوع را مورد توجه قرار داده، منسوب به بوعلی سینا است. از این رساله با نام‌های «الشفاء من خوف الموت ومعالجة داء الاغتمام» و «دفع الغمّ من الموت» یاد شده است. ابن‌سینا هم فیلسوفی برجسته، هم یکی از بزرگترین پزشکان دوره اسلامی است و بنا براین شایسته نظر‌ ورزی در خصوص این مسئله مرزی میان فلسفه و پزشکی است؛ ازاین‌ رو، محققان پس از وی و بویژه پژوهشگران معاصر ارجاعات بسیاری به نگاشته او داشته‌اند. با بهره‌گیری از پژوهش‌های پیشین و برخی دلایل متن‌شناختی دیگر روشن می‌شود که این رساله در اصل بخشی از کتاب تهذیب الأخلاق و تطهیر الأعراق ابوعلی مسکویه است که به اشتباه به ابن‌سینا نسبت داده شده است. این انتساب بدلیل اشتباه ناسخان، به سهو یا به عمد رخ داده است. پس از بررسی وجوه مختلفی که به این اشتباه انجامیده، انتساب این رساله به ابن‌ سینا نفی و صحت انتسابش به مسکویه اثبات می‌شود
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Throughout history, the fear of death or thanatophobia has preoccupied philosopher’s ideas and medical issues, and ethics. Since ancient times, philosophers have expressed their ideas about death and fear of dying in their books, alongside literary texts, stories, mystical and gnostic texts. In ancient Greece, in addition to Socrates and Plato, the Epicureans and Stoics played an important role in philosophizing death and thanatophobia. In the realm of Islamic philosophy, thinkers like Muhammad ibn Zakariyyā al-Rāzī (Rhazes), Abū ʿAlī Miskawayh, and Mulla-Sadra have commented on death and thanatophobia. Nevertheless, the only monograph which deals with death and death anxiety in detail is Philosophical Approaches to Thanatophobia and its Treatments, the authorship of which is attributed to the great philosopher and physician of the Islamic world, Avicenna. The work, which is published in the collection of Avicenna’s treatises, has been translated under different titles. As an eminent philosopher and competent physician, Avicenna has aptly philosophized death and thanatophobia, the authenticity has been acknowledged by the numerous references scholars and academicians have made to the work. However, the work, as this study suggests, is wrongly attributed to Avicenna. This treatise is, originally, a part of Abū ʿAlī Miskawayh’s Tahdhīb al-Akhlāq was Taṭhir al-Aʿaraq (Refinement of character and purification of dispositions), wrongly attributed to Avicenna, whether intentionally or inadvertently. Examining different aspects of this wrong attribution, this study textually demonstrates that the treatise is written by Miskawayh.